In the summer of 1777, British General John Burgoyne launched a three-pronged advance towards Albany, New York, with the goal of splitting off New England from the other colonies. One 1,800-man contingent, half Loyalists and half Native Americans, moved east from Lake Ontario to the Mohawk River Valley. Their primary target was the 500-man American garrison at Fort Stanwix. General Nicholas Herkimer, commander of the Tryon County militia based thirty miles away at Fort Dayton, was informed of the siege and assembled 700 militiamen to march to the fort’s relief.

Following their loss at Bemis Heights on October 7, 1777, the British Army was in a bad way, but there was still hope. General John Burgoyne had 6,000 well-trained soldiers and, although greatly outnumbered by the Continental Army, British-controlled Fort Ticonderoga was only fifty miles away.

General John Burgoyne’s British Army crossed to the west bank of the Hudson River in mid-September to continue its march towards Albany. General Benedict Arnold had placed American troops in a virtually unassailable position on high ground called Bemis Heights. On September 19, Burgoyne moved through heavy woods around the American flank, hoping to surprise the Continentals. However, Arnold, anticipating this move, sent Captain Daniel Morgan’s Virginia riflemen and Major Henry Dearborn’s light infantry to attack the British at Freeman’s Farm before they could deploy.

In the eight weeks since capturing Fort Ticonderoga, British General John Burgoyne had seen his army go from being invincible to facing starvation and defeat. The Americans were having issues as well. With the loss of Fort Ticonderoga, New Englanders in Congress had the perfect excuse to remove General Phillip Schuyler, who was strongly disliked, from command. He was replaced with General Horatio Gates, and General George Washington sent his best field commander, General Benedict Arnold, to assist as well. Unfortunately, Gates resented Arnold’s fame and that resentment would almost cost the Continental Army this campaign.

As General John Burgoyne’s British Army advanced deeper into New York in the summer of 1777, his supply line lengthened, making it more difficult to obtain supplies, especially given the wretched roads in the area. Living off the land was not an option as the Continental Army destroyed any provisions they could not carry off as they retreated. With the situation growing desperate, Burgoyne dispatched a detachment to capture a stockpile of supplies at Bennington. On August 16, these troops walked into a buzzsaw in the form of Colonel John Stark and 2,000 angry New Hampshire militiamen spoiling for a fight.

In June 1777, Fort Ticonderoga had been in American hands for two years, but little had been done to strengthen its defenses. The fort, commanded by General Arthur St. Clair, was garrisoned by 2,000 Continental troops but was not prepared to withstand an assault. When the vanguard of British General John Burgoyne’s 7,000-man army arrived in front of Fort Ticonderoga, British officers soon discovered Mount Defiance, a hill that dominated the fort, was unoccupied.

Following the failed American invasion of Canada in 1776, British General Guy Carleton pursued the retreating Continentals as far south as Fort Ticonderoga until the approaching winter halted Carleton’s advance and he retired to winter quarters. Unhappy with Carleton, Lord George Germain, England’s secretary of state for the colonies, replaced him with General John Burgoyne. Known as Gentleman Johnny, Burgoyne had developed a great plan to defeat the Continental Army, but he was relatively unfamiliar with warfare in North America and the logistical challenges presented by its seemingly endless forests.

In December 1777, following the loss of Philadelphia, General George Washington moved his Continental Army into winter quarters about 18 miles northwest of Philadelphia. Unfortunately, there were no shelters for the 12,000 soldiers and improvised wooden huts, housing 8-12 men, were hastily erected, but barely kept out the wind. Washington, who remained with his troops throughout the long winter, sent countless requests to Congress imploring them to alleviate his men’s suffering. But Congress, without taxation authority and little influence over the states, seemed powerless to help.

In the spring of 1777, most of the British army was stationed in New York. For his next move, General William Howe decided to attack Philadelphia, the largest city in the colonies and home of the Continental Congress. Rather than march over land through New Jersey, Howe sailed his regiments up the Chesapeake Bay and landed sixty miles south of the city. Washington quickly moved to get between Howe’s army and the capital but failed to guard a ford to his north. When the British attacked on September 11, 1777, they outflanked the Americans and Washington was forced to retreat.

After achieving a great victory at the Battle of Trenton, General George Washington recrossed the Delaware River hoping for a second miracle. In response, Lord Charles Cornwallis and 6,000 Redcoats marched towards Trenton and struck back at the bold Americans, leaving a battalion at Princeton, twelve miles north. On the night of January 2, 1777, Washington, unnoticed by British sentries, moved his men around the British flank towards Princeton and attacked at dawn. Perfect.

In late December 1776, after four months of hard-fighting, the 16,000-man Continental Army had dwindled to a force of 3,000 soldiers encamped in Pennsylvania on the west side of the Delaware River. General George Washington chose this desperate moment to strike a surprise blow at the Redcoats. He would cross the river Christmas night and attack the 1,500-man Hessian garrison in Trenton, knowing that the Hessians would be recovering from a day of Christmas reverie.

Although the Continental Army forced the British to evacuate Boston, Washington’s troops faced more setbacks than successes at the start of the American Revolution. By the time of Washington’s crossing of the Delaware, the army had dwindled down to roughly 3,000 poorly clad, poorly fed and poorly armed men. Thinking the end was near, Britain’s General Howe placed his soldiers in winter quarters. He would soon find out the American Army still had some fight.

The British army had spent three months in the summer of 1776 building a fleet to sail up Lake Champlain and assault American-held Fort Ticonderoga, which defended the southern end of the lake. Colonel Benedict Arnold had spent that same time making warships to defend the lake and delay the British long enough to strengthen the fort’s defenses. The two fleets were not evenly matched, as the British had 25 warships that were larger, more maneuverable, and carried more guns than Arnold’s 15 vessels. On October 11, British ships sailed up Lake Champlain and engaged the Americans. The fight lasted until sunset, by which time the larger British warships had greatly damaged or sunk their American counterparts.

After repelling the American assault on Quebec, General Guy Carleton and his troops returned to the safety of the city walls, content to wait for the coming spring and reinforcements from England. Despite the setback, Congress refused to give up on the conquest of Canada since American forces still controlled Montreal and much of the area along the St. Lawrence River. That all changed on May 6, 1776, when the first ships bearing more Redcoats arrived at Quebec.

On December 26, 1775, General Richard Montgomery held a council of war with the officers of his army besieging Quebec. Colonel Benedict Arnold argued strongly that an assault on the city must be tried, despite the slim chances of success. The plan called for Montgomery to attack Quebec’s Lower Town from the south while Arnold attacked from the north. Five days later, in a driving snowstorm, Montgomery launched the attack, but within minutes, was killed by British fire.

On November 14, 1775, after arriving at Quebec City with his 600-man force, Colonel Benedict Arnold issued an ultimatum to the inhabitants of the city: surrender or face an assault. The Canadians, recognizing the weak condition of Arnold’s army, refused his demand.

On November 8, 1775, Colonel Benedict Arnold and his troops came to the bluffs across the St. Lawrence River from Quebec City. Forty-five days earlier, this group of hardy Americans had started out from Fort Western on the lower Kennebec River. The rivers had flowed faster, the heights had been higher, and swamps more extensive than any had imagined.

Colonel Benedict Arnold’s army reached the Great Carrying Place, a thirteen-mile portage, on October 11, 1775. They had been moving north on the Kennebec River for three weeks but had only advanced eighty-four miles towards Quebec. After overcoming many obstacles, Colonel Arnold held a council of war with the lead division to discuss next steps and persuaded the men to continue on. However, a few miles downstream, the rear division was holding its own council of war. Without the fortitude of Benedict Arnold to strengthen them, they opted to turn back and took most of the provisions.

Colonel Benedict Arnold’s expedition to Quebec in the fall of 1775 is regarded as one of the greatest military marches in history. Arnold planned to lead his men up the Kennebec River and then over land through the unmapped wilderness of Maine to attack Quebec. The distance was estimated at 180 miles, taking 20 days to complete. Both assumptions would prove to be terribly wrong.

The first significant offensive operation of the American Revolution was the invasion of British Canada by American troops in 1775. It was the opening act of the Northern Campaign in which we hoped to take control of British Canada and secure our northern flank.